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 “Multitasking” is a very recent term. Its first use is widely attributed to Witt and Ward 
(1965) in an IBM technical manual describing a computer operating system. However, its 
application in describing human behaviour is much more recent, and a key issue is 
emerging. This is that “multitasking” is being used to describe (at least) two situations that 
might be distinct from each other in psychological terms.  
 
The first situation is where people are actively trying to do two or more tasks at the same 
time. Examples might be driving while making a phone call, or reading while simultaneously 
watching a film. Many recent examples are also given in the literature in relation to “media 
multitasking”, i.e. attempting to attend simultaneously to stimuli from multiple media 
sources (e.g. Ophir et al, 2009; see also Chapter 23 in the current volume).  
 
The second is where people have a “to-do” list of jobs or tasks in their minds, and are trying 
to optimise their behaviour in order to achieve the best outcome in relation to them. An 
example might be cooking a complex meal while also preparing the house for guests, and 
dealing with the demands of children.  
 
When people in everyday life describe themselves as “multitasking”, they may be using the 
term to refer to either of these situations almost interchangeably. And indeed, organised 
everyday life when seen over substantial time periods can often include examples of both, 
sometimes with the first form embedded within the second in complex ways. In both 
situations, there is an intention to perform more than one task, typically within a certain 
time-frame. But in the second situation there is no attempt to perform more than one task 
at the same time. Following Salvucci and Taatgen (2008), the term “concurrent multitasking” 
will be used to describe the first situation. For the second situation, this chapter will 
introduce the term “serial multitasking”. This paper will argue that there are significant 
differences between these two forms of multitasking, and that recent evidence from 





Although the term “multitasking” is a recent invention, it would be wrong to conclude that 
research relevant to human multitasking was not carried out before the invention of this 
term. In other words, it is the term “multitasking” that is new, rather than research into the 
corresponding mental phenomena.  
 
Until recently, dealing with the demands of multiple tasks was known as “multiple-task 
performance”. This was, in practice, most often the study of dual-task type paradigms 
where more than two tasks were used. In other words, it was the study of concurrent 
multitasking. The first book (to my knowledge) on that topic, was Diane Damos’ “Multiple-
task Performance”, published less than 25 years ago (Damos, 1991). In that book, Brookings 
and Damos (1991) point out that research into the nascent field of individual differences in 
multiple-task performance dates back more than 100 years, to e.g. the dual-tasking studies 
of Binet (1890) and Sharp (1899). They made the point that previously the most obviously 
relevant constructs or behavioural descriptions under examination were neither 
“multitasking” nor “multiple-task performance”, but were theoretical abilities described 
variously as “power of distribution of attention”, “division of attention” and “timesharing”. 
This latter term is especially important, since it is prima facie a behavioural description 
rather than a construct one, so may well either refer to concurrent or serial multitasking. 
Ackerman, Schneider and Wickens (1984) provided a definition: “time-sharing ability refers 
to the ability to perform multiple tasks in combination” (p. 71). Thus in practice, “time-
sharing” was synonymous with the term “concurrent multitasking” as it is defined today. It 
is the study of this behaviour (concurrent multitasking) which has been the overwhelming 
focus for studies and theorising in the cognate sciences, in particular experimental 
psychology, and more recently, computational modelling (see e.g. Keiras et al, 2000). There 
have been various interesting demonstrations from these experiments that may have 
relevance for understanding everyday life performance. For instance, Schumacher et al 
(2001) have argued that after only moderate practice, some people can manage almost 
perfect time-sharing between two basic choice reaction tasks, and Ophir et al (2009) 
demonstrated that heavy “media multitaskers” in everyday life performed more poorly on a 
test of task-switching ability, and argued that this is likely due to a reduced ability to filter 
out interference from irrelevant material. 
 
Historically, however, a recurring theme for the study of multitasking has concerned less the 
determinants of performance than whether there is a specific ability that is tapped by 
multitasking situations beyond that required for performance of the individual tasks 
themselves. From the earliest days this was bound up with notions of “intelligence”. One of 
the earliest views was expounded by McQueen (1917), which is a publication of his DSc 
thesis from 1915 at the University of London, U.K. The topic of the research was attributed 
to Charles Spearman, who was the laboratory director, and provided guidance for 
McQueen’s research until rejoining the Army on the outbreak of war. This link with 
Spearman may have been influential in the initial hypothesis for the research. McQueen 
wrote: “We certainly believe…that the assumption is without justification that a single 
test…affords a reliable measure of an individual’s “power of distribution” of attention…We 
shall show…evidence indicating that there is no such general power as a power to distribute 
the attention successfully” (p. 4). 
 
Spearman was of course the principal proponent of the notion of the existence in the mind 
of a general intelligence factor (or “g”). The main evidence for Spearman’s hypothesis was 
the repeated finding of “positive manifold” (i.e. more correlations that were positive than 
would be expected by chance) in correlation matrices of large numbers of people 
performing various disparate tasks. Perhaps it would have been awkward – or at least a 
complication - for the “g” hypothesis if there was an ability (multitasking) that existed 
outside the specialist skills required for the individual subtasks. To have “specific factors” 
playing such a super-ordinate role in behaviour might challenge the purity of the notion of 
“g”. So from the earliest days there may have been scepticism about the idea that 
multitasking involved an ability that was distinct from general intelligence. We will return to 
the issue of multitasking and intelligence below, because cognitive neuroscience has 
recently offered some startling new evidence that speaks to it, suggesting that this 
scepticism was not warranted. 
 Despite this early scepticism, the search for a specific “multitasking ability” continued. It was 
hampered however by the lack of information processing models that specified what 
operations such an ability would support, and the relation of this ability to others within the 
cognitive system (e.g. Ackerman et al, 1984). Ackerman et al (1984) presented the view 
quite clearly. They contend that when considering multitasking data from any one 
individual, there are specific sets of variance attributable to individual differences in ability 
to perform the subtasks, but also another quite separate source of variance that represents 
the persons’ time-sharing (aka multitasking) ability. They proposed that, as an example, that 
where two subtasks are being considered, approximately 25% of the score might be 
attributable to multitasking ability (with 37.5% attributable to each subtasks, assuming zero 
error variance). So, for Ackerman et al, multitasking definitely represents a special ability 
above and beyond those required to perform the subtasks themselves. As mentioned 
above, this chapter will outline modern cognitive neuroscience evidence that supports such 
a view, and it even suggests basic information about the neural substrates of multitasking 
ability. 
 
The confidence of Ackerman’s view contrasted with the main bulk of thinking from the 
1970s and 1980s. Brookings and Damos (1991) reviewed the evidence for a separate 
multitasking ability emerging from both factor analytic and non-factor analytic studies 
during that period, usually involving dual-task type paradigms. With notable exceptions (e.g. 
Sverko, Jerneic and Kulenovic, 1983), these studies failed to find evidence of such an ability. 
However, Brookings and Damos pointed out that most if not all of the principal studies had 
major limitations in the methodological design and/or analysis that would have limited the 
chances of discovery of one (i.e. an ability that would be used to deal with many different 
types of multitasking situation, as opposed to abilities that might be involved in dealing with 
only a limited subset of them) should one exist.  
 
There were nevertheless some interesting investigations. For instance, one way in which a 
general multitasking ability might be demonstrated would be if training in multitasking 
could be shown to generalise to other situations. Damos and Wickens (1980) examined 
performance on two task combinations to try to discover evidence that multitasking (or in 
their terminology, “timesharing”) skills are learned with practice and can transfer between 
task combinations. The first task combination consisted of a short-term memory task and a 
classification task; the second consisted of two identical one-dimensional compensatory 
tracking tasks, requiring participants to keep a moving circle centred within a horizontal 
track by using a control stick. One task was controlled by each hand. The experiment used 
three groups of participants. The first received dual-task training on both task combinations. 
The second received single-task training on the first task combination, and dual-task training 
on the second combination (the tracking). The third was given dual-task training on the 
second (tracking) combination only (i.e. no single-task training). By contrasting these groups, 
Damos and Wickens (1980) were able to examine the degree to which performance on the 
dual-task tracking task benefited from prior dual-task exposure. They found that transfer of 
learning was positive: earlier dual-task training did seem to develop a generalizable dual-
task skill. However, as pointed out by Lintern and Wickens (1991), the amount of transfer of 
timesharing adaptation from one situation to another was modest relative to the skill 
learning demonstrated on the individual subtasks. Moreover, they contend, “most 
timesharing skills may be specific to a given task combination and may not be of the generic 
type” (p. 136). This begs the question of the definition of a multitasking ability.  
 
In these ways, the issue of whether there are specific multitasking skills has historically been 
contentious. One suggestion presented here is that the source of this contention is that 
there may be different abilities that underpin behaviour in different multitasking situations. 
Thus it might have been more fruitful to have sought “multitasking abilities” (e.g. 
independent of “g”) rather than look for evidence of a single common one. Thus a wider 
consideration of the range of multitasking situations than has been considered historically, 
and especially in relation to multitasking demands that present themselves in everyday life, 




It should be clear from the foregoing historical context that the emerging field of 
“multitasking” has several issues at the heart of it. The first of these is that there is little 
formal distinction concerning whether the term refers to a behaviour, a construct, or a 
situation. In other words, does it refer to the act of doing several things at once - in which 
case are examples like walking whilst talking examples of multitasking? Or does it refer to a 
theoretical ability, in the same way as e.g. the term “working memory”? Or does it refer to a 
situation that is presented to a participant (e.g. three novel tasks are presented to a person 
with the instruction that they should attempt to do them all “at the same time”)? At various 
times in the past, terms have been used that seem to relate very strongly to the more 
recent term “multitasking” that might have been thought of as constituting any one of 
these.  
 
In this treatise, “multitasking” will be used in reference to the third kind of definition. In 
other words, that it defines a set of features of a situation that are presented to an 
individual. Ideally we then should be able to hone these features into a cardinal set that 
would distinguish multitasking situations or paradigms from any other (e.g. a dual-task 
paradigm, or a working memory paradigm etc.). If this definition of the term is adopted, it 
leaves open the matter of whether people who are multitasking are actually “doing several 
tasks at once”. This is useful, since it may side-step the traditional concerns of dual- or 
multiple-tasking (e.g. the nature of the psychological refractory period, or the switch cost in 
task-switching paradigms; Monsell and Driver, 2000). It is not that these issues are not 
important – far from it – but more that there is an opportunity with the new term to re-
orient the concerns of the area towards the everyday, at least for those who see that as 
desirable. In other words, to create experimental paradigms as starting points for 
investigation that deliberately model the demands of “real-world”, or “everyday” situations. 
Such a starting point may help offset the danger of becoming “phenomenon-driven” 
(Newell, 1973; Monsell and Driver, 2000) and thus encourage the paradigms used for 
research to be more closely aligned to the everyday situations for which experimental 
paradigms are usually intended to be a model. As Kieras et al (2000) put it, “future research 
must use a wide variety of empirical procedures to investigate multitask performance. This 
investigation should extend beyond basic laboratory paradigms like the task-switching and 
PRP procedures, which…come nowhere near to engaging the whole host of executive 
mental processes that people presumably have. Rather, to explore these 
processes…overlapping-task procedures with complex realistic tasks and unpredictable 
stimulus-response event sequences will be needed”. As we will see below, it is exactly these 
sorts of procedures that have proved a starting point for one particular line of investigation 
of multitasking within cognitive neuroscience. 
 
Serial vs. concurrent multitasking 
 
Interestingly an “everyday situation” is taken as the reference situation in the theoretical 
paper of Salvucci and Taatgen (2008). This paper aims to form a model of the demands 
made by concurrent multitasking. But these researchers do not take as a starting point a 
typical multiple-tasks type experimental paradigm. Instead, the cardinal example of a 
situation requiring multitasking that they describe is cooking in a busy kitchen. They imagine 
a cook trying to fulfil multiple food orders simultaneously. While some tasks can be carried 
out in parallel (e.g. baking fish in an oven while pasta boils on a stove), in many situations 
this cannot happen because either the same resource (e.g. oven) needs to be used for two 
separate tasks, or the cook is physically unable to perform two distinct complex actions at 
the same time. Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) point out that in this situation the cook needs to 
delay performing one action while another is carried out (p. 103). This everyday example 
illustrates well how multitasking in everyday life is often not a matter of a person 
attempting to do two tasks at the same time, as is asked of a participant in a typical 
experimental concurrent multitasking paradigms (e.g. those historically called dual- or 
multiple-task paradigms). Instead, much of the behaviour is more closely aligned to the 
definition of serial multitasking presented here. Thus we may have the beginning of a 
discontinuity between the demands of everyday life and those of experimental practice. 
 
Of course, I provide absolutely no evidence whatsoever for this contention (i.e. that much of 
dealing with several tasks in everyday life takes the form of serial rather than concurrent 
multitasking). But the motivation for it is to try to capture the essence of what people in 
“everyday life” (i.e. outside academia) mean by the term, in the hope that such a endeavour 
might guard against “phenomena-driven” experimental work – or at least that the 
phenomena under examination are those observed in the “real-world” rather than only the 
lab. 
 So let us consider what an “everyday” definition of a multitasking situation might look like. 
For this argument, let us leave aside the issue for the moment of concurrent vs. serial 
multitasking, and seek the broadest level of definition that encompasses all forms. We 
cannot start and end with the characteristic of “doing several tasks at once”, since people 
routinely perform two tasks at the same time: It depends what you call a “task”. So for 
instance, someone who is walking whilst holding a conversation could be argued to be 
performing two tasks simultaneously (i.e. transport to a destination, and having a 
discussion), and therefore “dual-tasking”. If one then adds the behaviour where that person 
is also opening an umbrella, then prima facie this might be “multitasking”. However, if one 
stopped a thousand people on a busy London street and asked them to give an example of a 
typical situation that requires “multitasking”, few would probably give an example this 
mundane. Instead, running through the examples that one would get would probably be the 
following characteristics: 
 
Characteristic 1: There are several tasks that are desired to be performed, and for some 
reason they cannot be done in pure sequence, i.e. task 1, task 2, task 3, etc. Instead, 
adequate performance will either: (a) require interleaving of responses, thoughts or actions 
in relation to the different tasks, e.g. task 1, task 2, task 1, task 3, task 2 etc and/or (b) 
require the person to be trying to do more than one task “at the same time”. It is the 
“trying” that is the important feature here, since it is a moot point as to whether many 
complex mental tasks can actually be performed “at the same time” when examined at the 
millisecond level. In this way (b) may actually be (a) when observed scientifically.  
 
Characteristic 2: There is novelty in either the combination or order of the subtasks being 
attempted. Highly overlearned sequences of co-ordinated behaviours, such as occurs for 
instance when an experienced driver is driving (e.g. checking the rear-view mirror while 
switching on an indicator) is unlikely to be described as “multitasking”. However introduce a 
novel requirement (or even better, several) into the sequence (e.g. ask the driver to count 
how many times he touches the brake medal in a 5 minute period) and most people would 
probably consider that as an example of some form of multitasking.   
 
Characteristic 3: This might refer to the distinctness of the tasks and therefore the level of 
interference between them. So, talking to two people in a three-way conversation is unlikely 
to be seen as a strong example of “multitasking” behaviour. But using two telephones to 
conduct two different conversations with different people at the same time probably would 
be, despite the fact that here there are also three people talking, and only one may be 
talking at a time, just as before. So captured in this “everyday knowledge” is perhaps a 
notion of holding some distinct stream of thought in mind (in this case the currently 
unattended conversation) whilst indulging in another stream of thought in relation to 
another goal or activity (the other conversation). 
 
Of course, there are many observations one might make about these characteristics. For 
instance, different multitasking situations will differ in the degree to which they show these 
characteristics. And the characteristics themselves are not easy to measure. Novelty, in 
particular, presents all manner of measurement and methodological problems (Burgess, 
1997).  
 
Another aspect is the intent of the participants (see Characteristic 1) as much as the 
situation that is presented to them. Indeed, one of the most common ways in which 
multitasking situations differ from each other is in the intent of the participants, and the 
way they conceive of the parameters of the task. The priority they assign is particularly 
important. In dual-task paradigms or multiple-task ones, the participant is typically 
instructed to try to perform both tasks at once. This does not mean however that the two 
tasks necessarily are given equal priority. A good example is Gopher (1993), who assigned 
equal priorities to two subtasks (visuo-manual tracking and a choice-reaction time (CRT) 
task) in one group of participants who were then given a series of dual-task-type practice 
sessions. In another group, the priorities for the subtasks were varied: sometimes it was the 
tracking task that was given priority, sometimes the CRT, and sometimes they were assigned 
equal priority. Gopher found that variable-priority training led to better performance on the 
two subtasks than fixed-priority training. This characteristic - that the participant is trying to 
perform two or more tasks at the same time (whether this is psychologically possible or not) 
is prima facie a feature of concurrent multitasking paradigms.  
 
However, as mentioned above, many everyday situations are not like the situation 
presented by Gopher. Instead, they often require serial multitasking. This is where, for 
practical or other reasons, only one task can be attempted at a time. The participants is not 
trying to do multiple tasks at the same time, but they are trying to get several tasks done 
within a certain time period, and for one reason or another they are not able to do each 
task from start to finish in strict sequence.  
 
While experimental psychology has concerned itself principally with studying concurrent 
multitasking situations, human neuropsychology (and to a lesser extent, cognitive 
neuroscience more broadly) has largely concerned itself with the study of serial multitasking 
situations (with a few notable exceptions, e.g. Baddeley et al, 1997).  One major difference 
between the two fields is that neuropsychology is driven to a greater degree by observation 
of people (in this case, patients) in everyday life. And it is serial multitasking situations 
where many patients with neurological damage to a certain part of the frontal lobes show a 
particular difficulty. These neuropsychological studies have clear implications for creating 
information processing models of the differing demands of these two multitasking 
situations, and so the data is highly relevant to experimental psychology and cognitive 
science, even though it is not often recognised.  
 
Everyday multitasking deficits in neurological patients: lessons for building 
information processing models 
 
What have we learned from neuropsychological studies about the nature of the 
organisation of the processes involved in serial multitasking? Well, the most obvious lesson 
from neurological patients is that deficits in serial multitasking ability can be seen in the 
context of intact intellect, as well as intact episodic memory, language, visuo-motor, visuo-
perceptual skills, as well as intact ability on most commonly used problem-solving tasks. This 
was first demonstrated empirically by Shallice and Burgess (1991). Thus neuropsychology 
provides strong evidence for a special (i.e. independent of “g”) multitasking facility of the 
kind that was sought by experimental psychologists for many decades, with rather equivocal 
results. 
 Shallice and Burgess (1991) described three people who had all suffered frontal lobe 
damage following traumatic brain injury. All three had no significant impairment on formal 
tests of perception, language and intelligence and two of them performed well on a variety 
of traditional tests of novel problem-solving. But they all demonstrated severe problems in 
everyday life, especially with situations that required serial multitasking. Shallice and 
Burgess (1991) invented two new tests of multitasking to quantify these problems. The first 
is called the “Multiple Errands Test”, and is a real-life multitasking test typically carried out 
in shopping precinct. Participants are pre-trained on a set of rules (e.g. no shop should be 
entered other than to buy something; spend as little money as possible), and then are asked 
to undertake a number of tasks while following them. The tasks vary in terms of complexity 
(e.g. buy a small brown loaf vs. discover the exchange rate of a particular foreign currency 
yesterday), and there are a number of “hidden” problems in the tasks that have to be 
appreciated and the possible course of action evaluated. For instance, the participants are 
required to write and send a postcard, but (a) they are given no pen; (b) they are instructed 
not to use anything not bought on the street to help them, and (c) they are also told that 
need to spend as little money as possible. In this way, the task is very “open-ended” or “ill-
structured”, meaning that there are many possible courses of action, and it is up to the 
individual to determine for themselves which one they will choose, and to a certain extent, 
what constitutes acceptable performance. 
 
Clearly, a task as complex as the MET taps many different abilities that relate to novel 
problem-solving, prioritization and so forth on top of pure multitasking ability. So in order to 
measure the multitasking component in a more controlled way, Shallice and Burgess 
invented a test called the “Six Element Test”. This required subjects to swap between 3 
simple subtasks, each divided into two sections, within 15 minutes, whilst following some 
arbitrary rules (e.g. “you cannot  do part A of a subtask followed immediately by part B of 
the same subtask). They were told that they should attempt at least some items of all 
subtasks. It was up to the participant to decide when to switch tasks since no signal was 
given, and although a clock was present, it was covered, so that checking it has to be a 
deliberate action of lifting the cover to check it. 15 minutes was not long enough to 
complete all the subtasks (or even all of one subtask), so the participants needed to 
remember to switch from one task to another before reaching completion, so that they 
have at least attempted all subtasks. The Six Element Test therefore has a strong 
component of voluntary time-based task switching (see Burgess et al, 2009, 2011; Gonen-
Yaacovi and Burgess, 2012 for review).  
 
 All three cases reported by Shallice and Burgess all performed both the MET and Six 
Element tests at a level below the 5th percentile level compared with age- and IQ-matched 
controls. On the MET the subjects made several different types of error. For instance, they 
found themselves having to go into the same shop several times, when they could have 
bought all they needed at one visit. They also forgot to carry out tasks that they intended to 
do, and often broke the tasks rules. There were also many examples of curious social 
behavior and interactions (e.g. offering sexual favours in lieu of payment). These kinds of 
social issues are a regular occurrence in this type of patient and it may potentially be 
instructive as to the basis of e.g. social attention (see Chapter 15 in the current volume, for 
an outline of the mechanics of social attention). Shallice and Burgess (1991) termed this kind 
of behavioural disorganization in the context of preserved intellect and other cognitive 
functions the “Strategy Application Disorder”. This term was chosen as to be reasonably 
neutral about range of difficulties that these patients might show upon further 
investigation. But one defining feature seemed to be impairment in situations requiring 
serial multitasking.  
 
On the specificity of the multitasking impairment in neurological patients.  
 
The demonstration that serial multitasking impairments can be seen in the context of e.g. 
intact IQ is a strong indication for a specific ability that underpins at least some forms of 
multitasking.  However, one might argue that the types of tasks used above tap more than 
just multitasking abilities. For instance, they may require planning, and “monitoring” (i.e. 
keeping a record of where you are in a goal list), and remembering of the task rules. So 
Burgess et al (2000) used the group lesion study methodology to investigate whether 
impairments in these sorts of stages of performance (e.g. planning) were a root cause of 
multitasking impairments. Sixty acute neurological patients and 60 age- and IQ-matched 
healthy controls were administered a multitasking test similar to the Six Element Test.  
Before participants began the test, their ability to learn the task rules (by both spontaneous 
and cued recall) was measured. They were then asked how they intended to do the test, 
and a measure of the complexity and appropriateness of their plans was gained. This 
enabled us to look at whether their failures could be due to poor planning. The participants 
then performed the task itself and by comparing what they did with what they had planned 
to do, a measure of “plan following” was made. Multitasking performance itself was 
measured as the number of task switches minus the number of rule breaks. After these 
stages were finished, subjects were asked to recollect their own actions by describing in 
detail what they had done. Finally, delayed memory for the task rules was examined. 
 
This procedure enabled us to demonstrate the specificity of the deficit in patients who fail 
the test in the context of good planning, comprehension and (retrospective) memory 
abilities. Critically, we found that patients with left hemisphere rostral PFC lesions (i.e. the 
most anterior regions of prefrontal cortex, variously also referred to as frontopolar cortex or 
Brodmann’s area 10), when compared with patients with lesions elsewhere, showed a 
significant multitasking impairment despite no significant impairment on any variable except 
the one reflecting multitasking performance. In other words, despite being able to learn the 
task rules, form a plan, remember their actions, and say what they should have done, they 
nevertheless did not do what they said that they intended to do.  
 
Notably, perhaps, we have recently found that patients with rostral PFC lesions show 
problems with certain tasks which require time perception (Volle et al, 2011). How this 
relates to multitasking problems we do not currently know. But it may turn out to be 
instructive (e.g., see Chapter 3 in the current volume, for discussion of temporal attention). 
 
Whatever the precise cause, the link between serial multitasking deficits and damage to 
rostral PFC has been replicated using the group lesion method first by Dreher et al (2008), 
and then John Duncan’s group in Cambridge, UK (Roca et al, 2010, 2011). Roca et al’s (2010) 
study is particularly noteworthy in the current context in that it showed that multitasking 
deficits were still seen even after the scores were adjusted for change in a specific measure 
of “fluid intelligence” (Cattell’s Culture Fair test). So after 20 years of research into serial 
multitasking deficits in humans, we seem to have reached as good an agreement as 
scientists usually can that serial multitasking is a behavior that makes demands upon a 
resource that is independent from “IQ”, and that there is an area within rostral PFC that 




The cognitive demands of serial multitasking 
 
If serial multitasking performance is not strongly related to IQ, or a range of other 
cognitive/problem-solving abilities, then what might be the processes that support it? This 
section will consider some possibilities. 
 
Clearly, the situations presented to the participants when they are asked to do the MET and 
SET are very different from e.g. a typical dual-task or multiple-task paradigm used in the 
experimental psychology literature. Specifically, the characteristics of the MET and SET have 
been described by Burgess and Wu (2012) and are detailed in Table 1. Characteristic 6 is not 
a necessary feature and may not occur in most experimental situations (like the Six Element 
Test when given clinically), but is an added and important determinant of performance in 
typical everyday life.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The findings of a specific link between serial multitasking deficits and rostral PFC damage 
invites (although it does not provide) a first-pass constraining of the possible candidate 
mental processes that supports the behavior to those that have been associated with rostral 
PFC function. So what are they?  
 
Rostral PFC structures have been found to support, at least in part, a wide range of mental 
abilities. These include analogical reasoning, maintenance and execution of delayed 
intentions (aka prospective memory), source and context memory, mentalising, mind-
wandering and other stimulus-independent mental phenomena, time perception, humour 
judgment, and task initiation speed (Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi and Volle, 2012; Burgess and 
Wu, 2013; Gilbert et al, 2007, 2012). One theory of the role of rostral PFC in cognition is that 
it underpins an attentional “gateway” that allows one to control the degree to which one is 
engaging in stimulus-independent thought (e.g. an inner mental dialogue) versus attending 
to external stimuli. This theory is known as the “gateway hypothesis”, and the theoretical 
construct underpinning this mental ability is known as “XN attending control” (Burgess et al, 
2005, 2006, 2007). 
 
Why should the information processing associated with these types of behaviours be 
particularly associated with performance in serial multitasking situations, especially 
everyday-type ones? One possibility is that while it is the case that the kinds of mental 
phenomena associated with rostral PFC function may have little relation to performance of 
the kinds of highly constrained and very structured tasks that are typically administered to 
participants in a brain scanner, or in an experimental psychology study, this may not be true 
of very open-ended serial multitasking tasks like those that have the characteristics outlined 
in Table 1. In typical fMRI experimental tasks, for instance, it is ideal to have a large number 
of repeated trials or responses (often presented in pseudo-random order to avoid artifact), 
and it is nearly always very clear to the participant what exactly is required of them, and 
whether they are succeeding or not. However this is NOT typical of many or maybe even 
most tasks in everyday life, at least outside the classroom or a very repetitive job. In more 
“realistic” experimental tasks, or open-ended or “ill-structured” everyday life situations, 
metacognitive introspections about e.g. how well one is doing, or what is expected of one, 
may well one highly helpful to task performance. In this way there may be consistent 
patterns of perceptual decoupling occurring (for more information about these kinds of 
phenomena please see Chapter 10 in the current volume). So recent research into the 
functions of rostral PFC is suggesting that there are many cognitive abilities that are 
specifically designed to help individuals to be competent in everyday life, but are not at all 
well-captured in many experimental situations.  
 
In my lab, we have been examining the plausibility of the hypothesis that XN attending 
control (see above) is a central feature to the performance of tasks which involve activation 
of a delayed intention, which is a central feature of many serial multitasking situations (see 
Characteristic 4 in Table 1). Benoit et al. (2012) designed an fMRI paradigm which 
parametrically crossed XN control with a task involving maintaining and executing a delayed 
intention. We found that there was considerable overlap in the brain regions that showed 
BOLD signal change during the XN control manipulation and those involved in conditions 
involving a delayed intention (see also Burgess et al, 2011; Volle et al, 2011). These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that being able to effect good control over the direction 
of one’s attending is an important determinant of being able to schedule and interleave a 
series of tasks within a certain time-frame (i.e. serial multitasking). 
 
By contrast, perhaps concurrent multitasking makes fewer demands upon processes 
involved in dealing with delayed intentions. This might be because the “goal list” or “goal 
instructions” for each task are being consciously rehearsed, or are, to use the frame work of 
John Duncan, integrated into a single “task model” (Duncan et al, 2008). If this was the case, 
then one might expect in neuroimaging experiments to see a different pattern of activation 
during concurrent multitasking compared with serial multitasking. 
 
Etienne Koechlin and his colleagues have examined this situation directly. Instead of 
“multitasking”, Koechlin has used the term “cognitive branching” to describe “a domain-
general core function that enables the brain to contingently put on hold one behavioural 
option/task in order to perform another one” (Koechlin 2013, p. 285). This provides a rather 
good description of the situation being investigated by researchers interested in 
multitasking (especially serial multitasking), and indeed, in later work (e.g. Dreher et al, 
2008) the construct “cognitive branching” was re-described as “multitasking”. The task that 
Koechlin introduced was ingenious. There were four conditions, and in each, individual 
letters (appearing in either upper or lower-case) from the word “tablet” were presented 
one-at-a-time to participants. In the first, control condition, participants were asked to 
judge whether two successively presented letters were in immediate succession in the word 
`tablet' (only upper-case letters were presented). In the second condition (“delay 
condition”), participants were also asked to decide if two successively presented upper-case 
letters occurred in immediate succession in the word “tablet”. But this time they were asked 
to ignore lower case letters. This meant that there was a delay period for upper-case letters. 
The third condition was a dual-task condition. Here, participants also had to decide if 
successively presented letters (paying attention to both upper can case letters) were in 
immediate succession in the word “tablet”. They also had to decide if each first letter 
indicating a case change was the letter T (or t). The fourth condition was the multitasking 
condition. Here, they essentially had to do both of the previous tasks. So for successive 
upper case letters, or for successive lower case letters, participants decided whether the 
current letter followed immediately the previously presented letter in the word “TABLET” 
(or ‘tablet”). And they also had to decide whether each first letter signifying a case change 
was the letter T (or t). 
 
Koechlin et al (1999) found bilateral BOLD signal increases during the dual task condition in 
the posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex BA (Brodmann's area) 9, the middle frontal 
gyrus, close to the pre-central gyrus (BA 8), and the lateral lateral inferior parietal lobule (BA 
40). There were no specific brain regions identified in the delayed condition. However, in 
the multitasking condition there were blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal increases 
found bilaterally in dorsal aspects of the rostral prefrontal cortex (i.e. the frontal pole, or BA 
10). BOLD signal increase in these regions only occurred in the multitasking condition, and 
was similar in the other conditions, including the control condition. This meant that the 
rostral prefrontal cortex activations could not be explained by differences in “task difficulty” 
as indexed by task performance, since that would have been reflected in a gradual increase 
from the control to the delayed task dual-task and branching conditions. One of the key 
aspects of Koechlin’s study was that it gives evidence that dual-task performance and serial 
multitasking are not identical in terms of the neural architecture that supports them. It is 
tempting to conclude that perhaps this is the result of concurrent performance of more 





Research into the cognitive and brain basis of multitasking behaviour has, in scientific terms, 
only just started. There are early signs that the criticisms that were made of dual-tasking 
research thirty years or so ago (e.g. lack of theoretical underpinning; paradigm-bound 
research) may not also be made of this emerging field. There are useful theoretical models 
emerging (e.g. Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008), partly because we now have methods for theory 
testing that were only incipient back then (e.g. computational modelling). And we now have 
demonstration of neurological patients with circumscribed lesions that have caused 
circumscribed multitasking problems, in effect answering a question that is nearly 100 years 
old: whether there is a specific multitasking ability beyond that which is required for 
performance of the subtasks themselves. If patients with rostral prefrontal cortex (brain 
area 10) damage can be absolutely unimpaired at the subtasks themselves but show 
catastrophic impairment in organising their performance when many tasks are put together, 
then prima facie this is strong evidence that putting several subtasks together makes 
demands beyond that of the individual subtasks together. Moreover, there is confirmatory 
evidence in terms of localisation from neuroimaging – again, a new method that did not 
start to exert itself until the mid-1990s.  
 
One main current focus in the cognitive neuroscience of multitasking is trying to understand 
how the brain supports the ability to remember to carry out an intended act at a future time 
(i.e. prospective memory), since this seems highly relevant to understanding serial 
multitasking. Dual-task or concurrent multitasking type paradigms seem to make demands 
upon different parts of the brain than serial multitasking. Since those regions are often also 
closely associated with “working-memory” type paradigms, one possible explanation 
consistent with these results is that concurrent multitasking ability may be relatively more 
related to active rehearsal or maintenance of a goal set, whereas serial multitasking may 
stress relatively more those process relating to delayed intentions. Accordingly, for serial 
multitasking, a key concern for behavioural study becomes that of “intention cost”, first 
demonstrated behaviourally (as far as I am aware) by Burgess et al (2003; Figure 1, p. 910). 
This is the cost of performance upon the current task you are performing caused by 
maintaining a delayed intention, in this case, to do the next scheduled task. There are 
echoes here of Witt and Ward (1965) who said “half-completed tasks, in a multitasking 
operation, tie up the system facilities and prevent other tasks from proceeding” (p. 58). How 
this relates to e.g. the aspect of novelty of the subtasks and the combinations of them is 
however not known, and this may be a promising avenue of enquiry for experimental 
psychologists.  
 
An attempt at a simple behavioural analysis of the characteristics of serial multitasking has 
been attempted here. But it is preliminary, and the defining characteristics of concurrent 
multitasking situations are as yet not well established either. Clearly, we would all agree 
that “multitasking situations” are where someone is dealing with multiple tasks or demands. 
But what might we say beyond that, in terms of instructions to participants, or their aims, or 
the nature of the subtasks? How much does one have to alter a subtask (and in what way) 
before it can be considered a “different task”? Are well-rehearsed combination of actions 
and behaviours (like walking whilst talking) examples of multitasking, and if not, why not? It 
seems that the issue of the novelty of the combination of actions or tasks is likely key to our 
definition but there is relatively little work in that area as yet.  
  
A fascinating possibility for understanding the basis of multitasking is presented by 
Messinger et al (2009), who claim to have discovered “multitasking neurons” in the 
prefrontal cortex of primates. In their experiment, monkeys were required to attend to a 
visual stimulus at one location while remembering a second place. Most neurons specialized 
in either attentional or mnemonic processing. But about one-third of the cells responded to 
features of both, and they termed these “multitasking neurons”. They argue that these 
neurons afford an advantage for situations where two or more demands are made 
simultaneously. They do this by having stronger tuning than more specialised cells, and 
expressing preferred directions for attention and for working memory (they may even 
oppose one another). In this way, Messinger et al argue that pairs of multitasking neurons 
can represent cognitive parameters more efficiently than pairs that include even a single 
specialized cell. This view may have received further momentum by the recent finding from 
Takeuchi et al (2013) who gave healthy young adults four weeks of concurrent multitasking 
training, and examined the brain changes that occurred over that period (in regional grey 
matter volume, and also in resting functional connectivity). They found that concurrent 
multitasking training was accompanied by increased regional grey matter volume in three 
subregions of the prefrontal cortex (left lateral rostral PFC; dorsolateral PFC, and the left 
inferior frontal junction) as well as a set of regions outside the frontal lobes (left posterior 
parietal cortex; left temporal and lateral occipital regions). They also found decreased 
resting-state connectivity between the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex. Takeuchi et al (2013) argue that these results may suggest that 
there are some neural changes that are not tightly restricted to specific task conditions. 
There are resonances here perhaps with John Duncan’s (2001) adaptive coding theory of the 
properties of prefrontal cortex. The notion that frontal neurons may have a less tightly 
specialised functional capacity than neurons elsewhere in the cortex is an attractive one. 
However, at least for rostral PFC, there is considerable evidence now for a large degree of 
functional specialisation within this large brain region (Burgess et al, 2007; Burgess, Gonen-
Yaacovi and Volle,  2012; Burgess and Wu, 2013), and it does not seem implausible that 
there may be neurons that are highly involved with e.g. maintaining an intention over a 
delay period. Whether this sort of function can be linked very specifically to a particular 
behaviour once we understand the operations they perform at the information processing 
level remains to be discovered.  
 
But at this very early stage of investigation into multitasking, many of the basic questions 
have not even yet been asked, never mind answered. For instance, there is surprisingly little 
integration between the literature on task switching (see Chapter 7 in the current volume 
for a review) and that of multitasking, despite its obvious relevance.  A good place to start 
seeking these questions will be to look at the behaviours in everyday life that we label as 
multitasking, and ask what demands they make, and then create experimental analogues of 
them. This is already occurring in some fields (e.g. Hancock et al, 2003). This chapter argues 
that this approach in the neuropsychology of complex behaviours has been fruitful. It 
contrasts with a “construct” (rather than behavioural) led approach that e.g. first posits a 
multitasking construct (independent of a particular behaviour) and then builds a paradigm 
to test that theory, with little regard to whether the resulting task is anything like situations 
that are encountered in everyday life either now or in human history. One danger of the 
latter approach is that we may end up studying situations that are so divorced from those 
that the cognitive system will have developed to deal with (in an evolutionary sense) that 
we may be examining curiosities of the system rather than mechanisms fundamental to 




 Concurrent multitasking is where a person is attempting to do several tasks at the 
same time (e.g. talking on a mobile phone while shopping). 
 Serial multitasking is where people are interleaving several tasks but can only do 
one at a time. This interleaving often occurs because one task cannot be finished 
before another must start (e.g. when cooking a meal). 
 Serial and concurrent multitasking may make different cognitive demands.  
 Serial and concurrent multitasking may be supported, at least in part, by different 
brain structures, or at least by operation of the same brain regions to different 
degrees. 
 Serial multitasking ability seems to a surprising degree to be unrelated to general 
intellectual ability, as measured by many current IQ tests.  It is not yet well 




 In what ways do open-ended multitasking tests (i.e. where the participants decide 
for themselves what to do and when) make different cognitive demands from ones 
where the optimal course is decided by the experimenter? 
 In what ways are well-practiced multitasking situations different from novel ones, at 
information-processing and neural levels? 
 What are the respective roles of dorsolateral and rostral prefrontal cortex in 
multitasking? 
 Do serial and concurrent multitasking abilities change over the lifespan in the same 
way?  
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Characteristics of typical serial multitasking situations in everyday life according to 
Burgess (2000). 
 
1. A number of discrete and different tasks have to be completed. 
2. Performance on these tasks needs to be dovetailed in order to be time-effective. 
3. Due to either cognitive or physical constraints, only one task can be performed at any one 
time. 
4. The appropriate stages for returns to task are not signaled directly by the situation. 
5. There is no moment-by-moment performance feedback of the sort that participants in 
many laboratory experiments will receive. Typically, failures are not signaled at the time 
they occur. 
6. Unforeseen interruptions, sometimes of high priority will occasionally occur, and things 
will not always go as planned. 
7. Tasks usually differ in terms of priority, difficulty and the length of time they will occupy. 
8. People decide for themselves what constitutes adequate performance. 
 
